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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
1. R. Bruce Stone (hereafter "Mr. Stone"), Appellant. Mr. Stone was the petitioner 
below, and defendant in two small claims proceedings filed by the Appellee, Mr. 
Slade. 
2. Chris Slade (hereafter "Mr. Slade"), Appellee. Mr. Slade was the respondent below, 
and plaintiff in two small claims cases filed against Mr. Stone. 
3. James T. Bobo. Mr. Bobo was a second defendant named by Mr. Slade in the second 
small claims action filed. He has recently been dismissed from the small claims action 
when Mr. Slade elected not to pursue claims against him further. Mr. Bobo did not 
participate in the case underlying this action. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action was brought before the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(J) (1953, as amended). The case has since been transferred to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953, as amended). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, § 5. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following three issues are raised in this appeal: 
1. Issue: Should a person who expects to be a defendant in a personal injury 
action before the small claims court be allowed to obtain and preserve evidence pursuant 
to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? This issue was raised in the appellant's 
Verified Petition, R. 1, and in all proceedings afterward. 
Standard of review: This issue relates to the interpretation of court rules, statutes, 
and constitutional rights, as well as legal determinations of rules or principles which 
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should be uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and similar status in similar 
circumstances. As such, the trial court's decision should be reviewed for correctness. 
Parks v. Utah Transit Authority, 2002 UT 55, U 4, 43 P.3d 473; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 
856, 858-859 (Utah 1995). 
2. Issue: Should a person who expects to be a defendant in a personal injury 
action before the small claims court be allowed to obtain and preserve evidence under 
equitable doctrines? The equitable arguments in the underlying case were most fully set 
forth in the Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition to Perpetuate Testimony, pp. 10-
11,7?. 32-34; though the petition invoked equity in asking for "Such other orders to insure 
the petitioner is able to discover the facts necessary..." Verified Petition to Perpetuate 
Testimony, p. 4, R. 4. 
Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue is the same as that set 
forth above. 
3. Issue: When a person files a petition seeking to obtain and preserve evidence 
under Rule 27 and equitable doctrines, does the filing of a small claims action by a 
respondent to the Rule 27 action operate to terminate the person's right to obtain and 
preserve discovery? This issue was argued by the respondent, Mr. Slade, and is 
implicated by the court's order that the defendant should exhaust all small claims 
procedures. Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Request to Perpetuate Testimony, 
p. 3-5, R. p. 14, Order Denying Petition to Perpetuate Testimony, R. p. 59. 
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Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue is the same as that set 
forth above. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a petition by Mr. Stone to obtain and perpetuate testimony 
and other evidence pursuant to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and other 
equitable principles. Mr. Stone, Mr. Bobo, and Mr. Slade were involved in a minor three-
car rear-end accident in which Mr. Slade, the lead driver, claims he was injured. Record 
(hereafter "7?."), p. 1. Mr. Slade's treatment, so far as it has been disclosed to Mr. Stone, 
consists of a single visit with Dr. Mark D. Johnson the day after the accident and then 
treatment with Doctors Plus. R., p. 1-2 Doctors Plus is a clinic widely recognized as 
consistently providing treatment and charges that are excessive and not medically 
reasonable and necessary. See R., p. 45. Billing records from Dr. Johnson indicate the 
plaintiff had seen Dr. Johnson before. 7?., pp. 6 & 44. Reports of X-ray's ordered by Dr. 
Johnson and Doctors Plus both indicate the plaintiff had significant pre-existing 
degenerative changes to his cervical and lumbar spine. 7?., p. 2, 44. 
Mr. Slade filed a small claims lawsuit against Mr. Stone in November 2002. At 
the trial on that case, Mr. Slade apparently informed his counsel Mr. Bobo had struck him 
first, and counsel then moved to dismiss that case without prejudice, i?., p. 2. That 
dismissal was granted, over Mr. Stone's objection. Anticipating future litigation and Mr. 
Slade's refusal to provide evidence, Mr. Stone filed his Verified Petition shortly after the 
dismissal, i?., p. 1-4. Later, Mr. Slade's counsel sent a partial copy of a second Small 
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Claims Affidavit, but it was apparently not marked as filed with the court until the day 
Mr. Slade was served in this case, i?., p. 24. Mr. Slade has refused to produce any 
additional evidence regarding his personal injury claims, prior medical history, or other 
relevant material, and has resisted all efforts of Mr. Stone to obtain the same. R., p. 8-9. 
Judge Bohling signed the final order denying the petition on May 29, 2003. /?., p. 59. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The accident giving rise to the various suits occurred on December 5, 2001, 
and was a minor rear-end type of accident. The Mr. Slade, Chris Mr. Bobo, and Mr. 
Stone were drivers of the three vehicles involved. Verified Petition to Perpetuate 
Testimony (hereafter "Petition"), ffi[l-25 R. p. 1; Memorandum in Opposition to 
Petitioner's Request to Perpetuate Testimony (hereafter "Memo, in Opp"), p. 2, J^ 1, R. p. 
15. 
2. Subsequent to the accident, Mr. Slade sought treatment from Mark D. Johnson, 
M.D. once, the day after the accident. Affidavit of Dr. Neil Erickson, D.C, Iffl 4, R. p. 44. 
3. The day after the accident Dr. Johnson took x-rays, which showed degeneration 
of the spine at multiple levels that could not have been due to the accident. Id. fflf 5 to 9, 
R. p. 44. 
4. In his billing records, Dr. Johnson also used the CPT ("Current Procedural 
Terminology") Code 99213, which indicates Mr. Slade was an established patient of Dr. 
Johnson and had therefore seen him for prior treatment and/or evaluation. Id. at ^ 12 to 
15,#. p.44-45. 
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5. Mr. Slade subsequently sought treatment from Doctors Plus, a clinic whose 
treatment is consistently determined to be excessive and not medically reasonable or 
necessary. Id, ffif 17-20, R. p. 45. 
6. Mr. Slade's pre-existing degenerative conditions in his spine were probably 
symptomatic prior to the accident. Id., f 10, R. p. 44. 
7. On or about November 27, 2002, Mr. Slade filed a small claims action against 
the Mr. Stone only, alleging personal injuries as a result of the automobile accident and 
requesting the maximum allowed under the small claims court jurisdiction. Petition *f 12, 
R. p. 2; Memo, in Opp. ^ 5, R. p. 15. 
8. At the trial scheduled for the small claims matter, Mr. Slade apparently 
informed his counsel he believed Mr. Bobo was also at fault and the police report was in 
error. Petition <fl 13, R. p. 2; Memo, in Opp. ^ 8, R. p. 16. 
9. Mr. Slade then moved to dismiss his action without prejudice, with the stated 
intention to file another action, which would also name Mr. Bobo as an additional 
defendant. Petition ^ 14, R. p. 2; Memo, in Opp. ^  9. 
10. On February 27, 2003, anticipating Mr. Slade would again file a suit against 
Mr. Stone in a forum in which he could argue no discovery should be allowed, Mr. Stone 
filed his Verified Petition to Perpetuate Testimony, giving rise to this action. Petition, R. 
p . i . 
11. In a letter dated March 3, 2003, counsel for Mr. Slade forwarded an 
incomplete copy of a second Small Claims Affidavit and Order, which did not indicate 
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whether it was filed. In that letter, Mr. Slade's counsel also refused petitioner's prior 
requests to voluntarily produce records and information by stating, "After reviewing the 
medical records in the file, and after discussion with Mr. Slade, I am unaware of any 
relevant pre-existing conditions..." March 3, 2003 letter and attachments, Exhibit A to 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition to Perpetuate Testimony (hereafter "Reply 
Memo."), R. pp. 36-37. 
12. The only records or other evidence the plaintiff has ever produced are the 
police report, records from Doctors Plus, and the record of the single visit with Dr. 
Johnson the day after the accident. These were produced to the petitioner's insurer. 
Memo, in Opp. ^ 3, R. p. 15; Affidavit of Dr. Neil Erickson, D.C. If 16, R. p. 45. 
13. The Notice of Hearing and the Petition for the case underlying this appeal 
were served on Mr. Slade on March 12, 2003. Constable's Proof of Service, R. p. 13.1 
14. That same day, Mr. Slade's second Small Claims action against Ihe petitioner, 
now including Mr. Bobo, was marked as filed with the Small Claims Division of the 
District Court. Reply Memo, f 6 and Exhibit C, R. p. 24. 
15. On May 29, 2003, Judge William B. Bohling entered his order denying the 
petitioner's petition to perpetuate testimony. Order Denying Petition to Perpetuate 
Testimony, R. p. 59, attached as Addendum A. 
1
 The Constable's Proof of Service was attached to a copy of the Notice of Hearing 
and Petition which the constable served. It appears it is therefore listed in the District 
Court's Index as a second Notice of Hearing. 
2
 The District Court originally signed an order prepared by counsel for Mr. Slade, 
to which the petitioner had objected. In a Minute Entry Decision and Order dated May 
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16. The Small Claims Court has subsequently stayed the second small claims case 
pending this appeal. Small Claims Judgment, attached as Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The underlying action is a petition by Mr. Stone to obtain and perpetuate the 
evidence necessary to defend himself from Mr. Slade's claims of personal injury. The 
rights to obtain discovery are guaranteed by several constitutional provisions. Included 
among them are guarantees of Equal Operation of Law and Open Access to the Courts 
found in the Utah Constitution, and the Procedural Due Process guarantees in both the 
Utah and United States Constitutions. The small claims rules, on their face, do not allow 
for any discovery if the plaintiff is not inclined to produce it voluntarily. Where the 
plaintiff refuses to voluntarily comply with informal discovery requests, the result is a 
trial hearkening back to the times when parties to a dispute in a law court did not have to 
produce any discovery, and the trials were by surprise. Therefore, the equitable solution 
for this ancient problem, long unused in the face of modern discovery methods, becomes 
relevant. A separate action for discovery, either under Rule 27 or the equitable bill of 
discovery, is the most appropriate way to vindicate a defendant's rights while maintaining 
the simplicity of the small claims court. 
29, 2003, the District Court indicated it had inadvertently signed it before the objection 
had been presented to the court. Therefore the District Court vacated the prior order, 
sustained Mr. Stone's objection, and entered the substitute order appealed herein. See 
Minute Entry Decision and Order, R. p. 57; Objection to Respondent's Proposed Order, 
R. pp. 54-56, and the vacated order, Order Denying Petitioner's Verified Petition to 
Perpetuate Testimony, R. p. 51. 
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ARGUMENT 
J. The Constitutions of Utah and the United States guarantee a defendant in every 
civil case the right to obtain evidence for use in defending the case. 
Early Utah and United States systems of discovery envisioned the issues of the 
parties to be resolved upon facts ascertained through pleadings. In PHILLIPS, CODE 
PLEADING, Section 33, (2d Ed.) (1932). Throughout the development of common law, an 
eternal dilemma presented itself of how to make procedural rules definite enough to work, 
yet flexible enough to the litigants to allow justice. "Procedural rules are means to an 
end, not an end in themselves." CLARK ON CODE PLEADING, p. VIII (1928). As the 
continental system was developed, a considerable advantage was identified of 
development of issues prior to trial with full safeguards granted to litigants. Id. at 13-14. 
Also, in the development of the continental legal system has been the fundamental 
ability of a party to a lawsuit to obtain and preserve evidence in which to frame the claims 
and defenses thereto. Id. Unfortunately, many plaintiffs seek to deny evidence to a 
defendant by choosing to file personal injury cases in the small claims courts of this state. 
This choice is forum shopping in its most basic form. The small value of these cases are 
not an excuse to deny a defendant the right to prepare an adequate defense. That 
argument is as cold a comfort to a potential defendant as it would be to explain to a shop 
owner that he will be denied tools to protect himself from shoplifting as long as a 
shoplifter agrees to take less than $5,000. 
Utah law has historically preserved the right of a litigant to obtain evidence in 
litigation. Prior to the enactment of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the common law 
11 
in Utah specifically stated that rules of equity shall prevail over the rules of common law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 88-2-2 (1933). As a court of law and equity, a court can render justice 
to either party, even if the statute on its face limits access to vital information necessary 
for the defendant's defense. See Trenchard v. Reay, 70 Utah 19, 257 P. 1046 (Utah 
1927). 
By 1933, Utah statutes had codified a method of taking and preserving testimony 
(evidence) prior to litigation actually being filed. Utah Code Ann. § 104-52-2 (1933) 
allowed perpetuation of testimony upon application to the judge by a person who expects 
to be a party to a lawsuit and proof of some fact is necessary "in any other matter. . ." Id., 
at subsection (2). This statute was later changed to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 27 (patterned after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, initially 
passed in 1937). The advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 27, states this "rule offers a simple method of perpetuating testimony in cases where 
it is usually allowed under equity practice or other statutes." 
As the rules and laws of Utah and United States have long preserved a litigant's 
right to obtain discovery with specific provisions in either statute or the court rules, the 
right to obtain discovery is a right that has not been greatly commented upon by the 
courts. However, the courts have been clear the purpose of discovery rules is to 
"...[facilitate] fair trials with full disclosure of all relevant testimony and evidence," and 
".. .foster the fair and efficient exchange of information between the parties." Roundy v. 
Staley, 1999 UT App. 229, ^ 11 and H 17, 984 P.2d 404 (Cert. Denied by Roundy v. 
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Staley, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999) (Finding defendant should have produced surveillance 
video used at trial to impeach plaintiff even though a specific request regarding 
surveillance was not made.) In a case where the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
dismissal of a party's action due to the failure to participate in discovery, the Court stated, 
"A party to an action has a right to have the benefits of discovery procedure promptly, not 
only in order that he may have ample time to prepare his case, but also in order to bring to 
light facts which may entitle him to summary judgment or induce settlement prior to 
trial." W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 
1977). 
In filing the case in the small claims court, refusing to produce relevant evidence, 
and fighting against discovery, Mr. Slade is actively pursuing a course of action which 
results in a situation akin to what would occur if a plaintiff were allowed to take a case to 
trial without complying with any of the defendant's discovery requests. The Small 
Claims Courts Statute defines the purpose of the hearing of a small claims court to 
"...dispense speedy justice between the parties...," (Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-8(1), (1953 
as amended)) not to simply dispense speedy judgments under conditions lhat favor one 
party. Regardless of the set of rules established for a particular trial, to deny a defendant 
ability and opportunity to obtain evidence necessary to prepare an adequate defense is to 
abrogate a number of that defendant's constitutional rights. 
In order to pursue reasonable discovery, Mr. Stone filed a separate petition to 
obtain and perpetuate evidence prior to Mr. Slade's second suit. Clearly, Mr. Stone had a 
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reasonable expectation he would be a defendant to an action cognizable before a court of 
the State of Utah. He complied with the requirements of Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and historically having established a need for the information, and with 
the court left with the alternative of forcing a defendant to face a trial without relevant 
evidence with which to defend himself is a failure of justice as contemplated by Rule 
27(3). Mr. Slade's position below is that his subsequent filing of a small claims action 
precluded the discovery Mr. Stone would otherwise have a clear right to obtain. This 
argument is untenable. Even if the timing of Mr. Slade's second small claims filing was 
innocent, allowing a small claims filing to trump all valid means to obtain and perpetuate 
testimony would effectively nullify those means and render the provisions meaningless. 
Clearly, if Mr. Slade had filed a District Court action, the underlying petition would be 
moot, as that case would protect the defendant's right to obtain discovery. Until recent 
developments in relation to personal injury suits in the small claims court, there did not 
appear to be a reason for Rule 27 to be used for a personal injury case such as the 
underlying case. However, as the law has developed, the provisions of Rule 27 provide a 
means to allow the courts to protect an individual's constitutional rights to a defense, and 
still allow small claims courts to proceed under simplified rules. 
1. Equal Operation of the Laws requires the defendant be allowed to obtain 
and preserve discovery. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, § 24 provides: "All laws of a general nature 
should have equal operation." Recently, the Utah Supreme court has commented about 
this constitutional provision as follows: 
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In order for a law to be constitutional under the uniform operation of laws 
provision, "it is not enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is 
that the operation of the law be uniform." "A law does not operate 
uniformly if 'persons similarly situated' are not 'treated similarly' or if 
'persons in different circumstances' are 'treated as if their circumstances 
were the same.'" In other words, "[w]hen persons are similarly situated, it 
is unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons from among 
the larger class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has little or no 
merit." 
Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, \ 37, 54 P.3d 1069 (citations omitted). The Court went 
on to state, "Therefore, the equal protection principle inherent in the uniform operation of 
laws provision protects against discrimination within a class and guards against disparate 
effects in the application of laws." Id. at |^ 38. If a provision affects a fundamental and 
critical right to which the Utah Constitution has afforded special security, a heightened 
scrutiny is applied, "[A] statutory classification that discriminates against a person's 
constitutionally protected [fundamental or critical] right... is constitutional only if it (1) is 
reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective 
and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is 
reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Id. at % 42 (citations 
omitted). See also Bishop v. GenTech, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ^ 14, 48 P.3d 218. The 
classifications at issue in this case are those relating to parties of personal injury actions 
in the District Court, as opposed to parties of personal injury actions in the small claims 
department of that same court. These classifications relate to a fundamental and critical 
right, the ability of a person to defend his or her person or property in the courts of this 
state. 
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If the small claims statutes and rules do not allow a defendant to obtain discovery 
and a jury trial, this creates a disparity between the participants of small claims courts that 
can be viewed in two distinct ways. First, there is a vast difference between the potential 
plaintiff and the potential defendant. Second, defendants in a small claim court personal 
injury case are treated vastly differently from defendants in similar personal injury case in 
the District Courts. Appellant does not argue the provision of a small claims court to 
provide a speedy remedy for simple cases is not reasonable. However, when those rules 
and statutes combine to prevent a defendant from obtaining information necessary for an 
adequate defense, it creates a classification that is not reasonable nor equitable and does 
not further the objective of providing justice of any type, speedy or not. 
The first classification results in a wide disparity in what rights are allowed to a 
litigant. Potential plaintiffs are afforded the choice to sue for injuries in District Court 
with the full benefits of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or extinguish those same 
rights by filing a small claims court action if the plaintiff believes that would be more 
advantageous to his case. The potential plaintiff may analyze whether his case will be 
more valuable before a jury in the District Court, or, realizing his case and witnesses will 
not "play" well to a jury, file it in small claims to extinguish a defendant's right to 
demand a jury. The potential plaintiff may choose when to file a case in the District 
Court and avail himself of the full powers of subpoena to obtain records, or file it in a 
small claims court and extinguish the right of the defendant to use those same powers to 
discover the plaintiffs past conditions and claims. 
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Similar disparities are apparent for all the methods of discovery available. There is 
simply no reasonable basis for a disparity which allows a plaintiff to chose whether or not 
to allow an opponent to have access to the very procedures centuries of American 
Jurisprudence have shaped into the today's legal system. Essentially, this allows a 
potential plaintiff to conduct forum shopping, and in so doing select what rights a 
defendant available for defense. This disparity in the classes of litigants is not 
reasonable, and it does not advance the objective of providing justice. 
The second aspect of the classification this places on litigants is between personal 
injury defendants in District Courts as opposed to the small claims divisions of that same 
court. In the regular District Court, a defendant is afforded all the rights the petitioner 
seeks to secure for himself in defending Mr. Slade's suits, and more. Indeed, a plaintiffs 
actions in refusing to produce the information requested by Mr. Stone would subject that 
plaintiff to the sanctions of Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. According to 
the arguments of Mr. Slade, the defendant in small claims court has no ability to obtain 
relevant evidence or other discovery when the plaintiff chooses the small claims forum. 
The only factor distinguishing those District Court defendants from small claims courts 
defendants is the choice the plaintiff made is selecting the forum. 
This forum shopping does not advance the objective of "speedy justice," with 
relation to either classification discussed above, only speedy judgment. Such is not a 
reasonable basis for a classification which denies the defendant in small claims court the 
same fundamental constitutional and equitable protections afforded defendants in the 
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District Court. There is no apparent legitimate legislative objective for this classification, 
nor does it appear to have any reasonable relationship between the classification and any 
legislative purpose. 
It could be argued the $5,000 statutory jurisdictional limit is a classification for the 
purposes of this analysis. It is not a limit; rather it is a jurisdictional prerequisite. The 
disparities above apply to all parties who may have a claim worth less than $5,000. In 
other words, a plaintiffs personal injury claim may only be worth a few thousand dollars, 
a jurisdictional limit does not affect those plaintiffs in any way. Further for classification 
purposes it is no more reasonable a law denying a shop owner the right maintain 
surveillance and other protective measures to capture shoplifters if the shoplifter agrees to 
steal less than $5,000. 
On the other hand, allowing a defendant in a small claims case to obtain discovery 
of evidence through a Rule 27 petition or an equitable proceeding would cure this 
problem. This would afford a process by which a defendant could obtain relief where 
additional evidence not in the control of the defendant was necessary, but leave the 
simple rules in place for other defendants where additional discovery is not necessary. In 
the classic simple contract case so common to small claims court additional discovery is 
not normally needed, as both parties were present and acquainted with the circumstances 
surrounding the alleged contract. However, in a personal injury case the defendant is not 
likely present for the plaintiffs medical treatment, and likewise has no knowledge. 
Affording a separate proceeding to obtain the necessary evidence affords a method for a 
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defendant to vindicate his rights while maintaining the simple rules of procedure for the 
other small claims litigants. 
2. Preventing a personal injury defendant from obtaining evidence violates 
the Open Access to Courts provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Utah's Constitution also provides a guarantee that all parties will have open access 
to the courts. Article I, Section 11 states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
(emphasis added) 
The typical analysis of this provision is directed toward causes of actions that are 
eliminated, such as in Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) 
(Regarding a statute of repose.) However, the very terms of the Open Courts provision 
indicates, ".. .no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending..." Therefore, this 
provision clearly prevents abrogation of a defendant's rights to defend as much as a 
plaintiffs right to file suit. The analysis set forth in Horton is as follows: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his 
constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially 
equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially 
comparable substantive protection to one's person, property, or reputation, 
although the form of the substitute remedy may be different... Second, if there is 
no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of 
action may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
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Id. at 1094. This test can be applied equally to a defense to a suit. In this case, if Mr. 
Slade's interpretation of the small claims statutes and rules prevails, those rules and 
statutes operate to deprive the defendant of the tools necessary to discover and perpetuate 
evidence necessary for an adequate defense in a personal injury case. Unlike a small 
contract case between neighbors, personal injury actions require the fact finder to address 
significant issues relating to pre-existing conditions and medical testimony on causation, 
impairment, etc. For a defendant to defend against this, he needs to have the claims of the 
plaintiff evaluated by his own medical and possibly other experts. This requires the 
discovery of medical records, prior claims of injury, prior impairments, and likely further 
data regarding the accident and damages to the vehicles. Simply put, personal injury 
actions cannot be defended against by a brief perusal of a few records as the parties face 
the judge. 
The current rules foreclose all possibility for discovery with little more than an 
encouragement that the parties exchange information. In the underlying case, it is clear 
the plaintiff has a prior medical history, medical records must exist, and the plaintiff has 
significant degeneration at multiple levels of his spine that could account for his 
complaints. Precluding discovery in to this area effectively bars the petitioner from 
mounting an adequate defense. Further, there is no alternate remedy provided to meet the 
test. 
As noted above, the $5,000 limit is a jurisdictional limit and can be no more than 
illusory as an "alternate remedy." If Mr. Slade's cause of action were likely to be worth 
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significantly more than $5,000, the case would have been filed in District Court. The 
jurisdictional limit does not give the defendant any "alternate remedy," it only limits the 
scope of the group of persons whose rights to defend will be abrogated. Again using the 
example of a shop owner, it only limits the value of theft to which the owner has no 
defense. Further, the small claims acts and rules do not eliminate any clear social or 
economic evil. Instead, they may well foster a social and economic evil by encouraging 
personal injury cases of very little merit be filed in small claims courts, where a defendant 
is much less likely to be able to show how little merit they have. It is clear however, that 
the use, or abuse, of the rules and statutes in this way is an arbitrary, unreasonable, and 
unreliable method of encouraging "speedy justice," as it clearly favors one class of 
litigants over another. 
3. Procedural Due Process is violated by refusing to allow discovery of 
evidence. 
The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees both equal 
protection under the laws and due process. The Utah Constitution provides many of the 
same protections in Article 1, Sections 7 and 24. Indeed, the Utah Constitution provides 
due process protection which is equal to or perhaps greater than the federal due process 
protection. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991); Sett v. Board of 
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). Due process under both federal and state 
constitutions requires, at the very least, that all litigants be afforded the rights and 
opportunities articulated in statutes and constitutional provisions governing both civil and 
criminal proceedings. 
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Procedural due process rights guarantee that "'[e]very person who brings a claim 
in a court or at a hearing held before an administrative agency [have] a due process right 
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal.' As a general rule, 'due process demands a 
new trial when the appearance of unfairness is so plain that we are left with the abiding 
impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing unfair.'" Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). More specifically: 
All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, 
and must be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, to inspect 
documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can a 
party maintain its rights or make its defense. In no other way can it test the 
sufficiency of the facts to support the finding. 
D.B. v. Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the Dept. of Business 
Regulation, 779 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Utah App. 1989). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that where the credibility of a witness is critical to the outcome of the case, or where 
the disputed evidence touches on expert assessments and opinions, the trial court may not 
limit a party's evidence to proffers from counsel. Kawamoto v. Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 994 
P.2d 187 (Utah 2000) (finding that the trial judge abused his discretion by requiring 
defendant to proffer her rebuttal evidence in personal injury suit). Similarly, a defendant 
in a personal injury action should not be required to defend himself without highly 
relevant material evidence, such as prior medical records. The evidence found so 
important in Kawamoto would be impossible or at least greatly impaired by the inability 
to obtain discovery. For a doctor to make a determination on medical causation, he must 
necessarily consider the plaintiffs prior medical history and conditions. Preventing the 
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defendant from asking a doctor to review the plaintiffs prior medical records prevents the 
defendant from offering expert assessments and opinions, as surely as requiring only 
proffered evidence. Similarly, refusing to allow a defendant to obtain evidence of the 
plaintiffs prior history prevents cross-examination, at least to any extent that would be 
effective. 
In the underlying case, the few medical records provided indicate the plaintiff saw 
a Dr. Johnson the day after the accident. He took x-rays, which found significant 
degeneration in the plaintiffs cervical spine. Such could not have been from the accident 
the day before. In addition, the billing records for Dr. Johnson indicate the visit on that 
day used a code that indicates Mr. Slade was an established patient. Clearly, Mr. Slade 
has prior treatment and conditions that bear directly on causation in his personal injury 
claims against Mr. Stone. Indeed, the records suggest the x-rays taken by Doctors Plus 
conflict with those taken by Dr. Johnson. Even so, the plaintiff will not produce the 
films, which could shed some light upon this discrepancy. 
A party to a suit is not fully appraised of the evidence if he is prevented from 
obtaining discovery of relevant evidence for his defense. A party is denied his 
opportunity to cross-examine if he is prevented from obtaining information necessary for 
effective cross-examination. A party is denied the ability to offer evidence and 
documents in rebuttal if he is prohibited from discovering and preserving that evidence in 
the first place. This is the simple effect of Mr. Slade's choice to file his personal injury 
Interestingly, The Doctors Plus records indicate their x-rays found degeneration 
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claim in a small claims forum and then take the position he does not need to cooperate in 
any further discovery. It is a blatant violation of Mr. Stone's rights to due process. 
II. Equity allows a defendant the opportunity to discover and preserve evidence where 
no other avenue exists to a defendant or possible defendant. 
The position taken by Mr. Slade in the underlying case, that his choice of forum 
prevents the defendant from obtaining any evidence by discovery or otherwise, places the 
underlying claim into a litigation posture that has not been common in the United States 
since the nineteenth century. As a result, Mr. Slade resorted to a procedure not utilized in 
nearly as much time, the ancient bill of discovery and other equitable principles. It 
appears this procedure was not utilized much in Utah, as even the earliest cases were able 
to avail themselves of statutory and other discovery rules. The principal Utah case 
discussing equitable discovery is Larson v. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 318, 97 P. 483 (1908). 
In Larson, the court considered whether a personal injury plaintiff could be compelled to 
submit to a physical examination prior to trial. The Court discussed the general history of 
equitable bills of discovery, but then decided as a court of law, the trial court could not 
order a physical examination, "There can be no doubt that, in the absence of a statute, a 
law court is not authorized to compel the plaintiff, before trial, to...make answers to 
pertinent interrogatories...or concerning any other material issue..." Id. at 487. 
Therefore, Larson does not rule upon whether a bill of discovery is available, only that 
the trial courts at that time did not have the power at law, as opposed to equity. 
In reviewing the history of equitable discovery, however, the Larson court wrote, 
at different locations in Mr. Slade's spine. 
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...[The common law] generally allowed litigant parties to conceal from 
each other, up to the time of trial, the evidence on which they meant to rely, 
and would not compel either of them to supply the other with any 
evidence... Hence there arose the equitable remedy of bills for discovery to 
assist the prosecution or defense of an action pending in the lav/ court. 
Such remedy being somewhat circuitous and expensive, the 
Legislature... empowered the superior and other courts of common law...to 
order the inspection and production of any document or writings, or the 
inspection and examination of real or personal property. 
Id. 97 P. 483, 486-7. Where Mr. Slade refuses to produce relevant evidence, and the 
small claims statutes and rules to not provide for discovery in the small claims courts, this 
case is propelled into circumstances equal to the historical circumstances described by 
Larson. Indeed, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure preserve the option of a separate 
action for discovery. Rule 27(c) provides "This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an action to perpetuate testimony." Rule 34(c) provides "This rule does not 
preclude an independent action against a person not a party for production of documents 
and things and permission to enter upon land." The rules therefore recognize independent 
actions for discovery of evidence both from parties and non-parties. Given the 
developments in the law regarding small claims cases and discovery, the equitable powers 
of the courts discussed by Larson have once again become relevant and allow the 
defendant in a personal injury action to obtain the discovery necessary for a defense in a 
separate action. 
A number of other states allow equitable discovery actions under limited 
circumstances. In Wofford v. Ethyl Corp., 447 S.E.2d 187 (S.C. 1994), the South 
Carolina Supreme Court held the administrator of the estate of an employee who 
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sustained a fatal injury on the job could maintain an equitable action for discovery against 
the decedent's employer to inspect the employer's premises, documents and other 
tangible things to determine whether a claim existed against a third-party. That court 
recognized, "While modern discovery rules and liberal pleading requirements virtually 
eliminate the need to resort to an independent action in the form of an equitable 
proceeding for discovery, they do not totally displace the traditional equitable jurisdiction 
of the court to issue appropriate orders for independent discovery when effective 
discovery cannot otherwise be obtained and the ends of justice served." 
The Connecticut Supreme Court discussed the bill of discovery allowed in that 
state in Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333 (Conn. 1994), where one former business partner 
sought evidence from his former partner and his bank for the purpose of determining 
what causes of action, if any were available against the former partner. The Berger court 
described the action as follows: 
The bill of discovery is an independent action in equity for discovery and is 
designed to obtain evidence for use in an action other than the one in which 
the discovery is sought. As a power to enforce discovery, the bill is within 
the inherent power of a court of equity that has been a procedural tool for 
centuries. The bill is well recognized and may be entertained 
notwithstanding the statutes and rules of court relative to discovery. 
Furthermore, because a pure bill of discovery is favored in equity, it should 
be granted unless there is some well founded objection against the exercise 
of the court's discretion. 
Id. at 337 (emphasis added). The Burger court found the petitioner met the requirements 
to obtain the documents sought. 
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In Temple v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 840 P.2d 561 (Mont. 1992), the Montana 
Supreme Court recognized that "Although modern discovery rules and liberal pleading 
requirements virtually eliminate the need to resort to an independent action in the for of 
an equitable bill of discovery, they do not totally displace the traditional equitable 
jurisdiction...to issue appropriate orders for independent discovery when effective 
discovery cannot otherwise be obtained and the ends of justice are served." Id. at 564 
(emphasis and citations omitted) (quoting Shorey v. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. 511 
A.2d 1076, 1078 (Me. 1986)). However, to avoid "fishing expeditions," the Montana 
Court went on to limit the theory to persons or entities who would not be defendants to a 
contemplated action, noted each of the entities from which the petitioner sought evidence 
was a potential defendant, and rejected the petitioner's arguments Rule 11 required him to 
conduct the discovery prior to filing a complaint against the defendants. 
The courts of other states have also held equitable discovery is available in the past 
few decades. Davila v. Continental Can Co., 500 A.2d 721 (N.J. Super. A. D. 1985) 
(citing the equitable bill of discovery as precedent, the court found an injured employee 
could file suit against a "John Doe" defendant and name the employer as a defendant for 
the purpose of identifying manufacturers of equipment that injured plaintiff), but see 
Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., Inc., 762 A.2d 311 (N.J. Super. A. D. 2000) (Where 
other identified defendant dismissed, defendant named for discovery purposes only could 
not be maintained as a defendant.)(overruled 790 A.2d 884 (N.J. 2002)); Lutz 
Engineering Co. Inc. v. Sterling Engineering & Construction Co., Inc., 314 A.2d 8 (R.I. 
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1974) (Bill of discovery recognized as still available, though rendered obsolete for all 
practical purposes by modem discovery methods. However, where Arbitration participant 
sought a deposition and legislature was presumed to have deliberately left out a provision 
for depositions in the specific public works arbitration statute which was found in the 
general arbitration statute, the court ruled no deposition should be allowed.); Adventist 
Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. v. Hegwood, 568 So.2d 1295 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1990) 
(Mother whose child died at hospital was permitted to obtain a "pure bill of discovery" to 
obtain information necessary to meet the pre-litigation requirements of Florida's 
malpractice statutes.), but see Plublix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Frazier 696 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 
App. 4 Dist. 1997) (Pure bill of discovery not available to potential workers compensation 
plaintiff where the claimant merely wished to determine if he had any cause of action.) 
Fewer courts have held a bill if discovery should not be allowed, though with the 
possible exception of Kansas, most base this decision on the idea the modern discovery 
methods and statutes make the bill unnecessary. For example, in Hardenbergh v. Both, 
73 N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1955), the Iowa Court held "The equitable action to obtain a bill of 
discovery was long since abrogated by these later proceedings except as to certain 
definitely prescribed matters." The Iowa Court then argued, "...[T]he new rules furnish 
means for discovery, at law or in equity, which are broader than the former inherent 
equity jurisdiction." In other words, the Iowa Court felt the bill of discovery was 
abrogated because it was no longer necessary. 
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In Guertin v. Guertin, 561 N.E. 2d 1339 (111. App. 1990), the Court refused to 
uphold a contempt order when siblings obtained an order from the trial court ordering a 
sister-in-law to appear at a deposition to evaluate whether she exerted improper influence 
to have the testator list her and her husband as joint tenants to certificates of deposit. The 
Guertin court felt the bill of discovery had not been codified, and therefore vacated the 
contempt order. 
It appears the state most contrary to bills of discovery is Kansas. In Austin v. 
Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., 891 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Kan. App. 1995) the 
court cited a prior Kansas decision in stating, "[Ejven under the federal rules, discovery 
'does not constitute an unrestricted fishing license.'" (quoting Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. 
Gleson Hospital Inc., 360 P.2d 858 (Kan. 1961) (Insurance company which allegedly 
discovered fraud by hospital in claims not allowed to obtain copies of records of 
previously settled claims to determine if fraud existed in those prior claims.). In response 
to the appellant's argument in the Austin case, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that the 
amendment of the federal and Kansas rules of civil procedure with Rule 34(c) was to 
eliminate confusion about whether Rule 34 would preclude actions for discovery in 
jurisdictions where they were allowed. Id. at 1145. The Kansas court felt the Kansas 
statutes did not create the right to pursue independent discovery action, finding 
significance in Kansas's failure to adopt the 1991 change to Rule 34(c). Id. at 1145-6. 
The common thread in the cases where an equitable discovery action was not 
allowed is the fear a plaintiff will use equitable discovery actions as a "fishing 
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expedition" to try and find a basis for a cause of action for which there is no independent 
evidence. This is easily distinguishable from the case underlying this appeal. In this case, 
the plaintiff has already filed suit, but refuses to produce evidence relevant to the claims 
asserted by the plaintiff and which are necessary for the defendant to formulate an 
adequate defense. What few records have been produced indicate there is probable cause 
to believe additional relevant records and other evidence exists. Unfortunately, recent 
developments in Utah Law allow a personal injury action in small claims court, but then 
claim the defendant has no right to obtain the evidence universally recognized as 
necessary to defend a personal injury action. Mr. Stone is not requesting a fishing 
expedition to discover a cause of action against Mr. Slade, he is only requesting the 
means to defend himself, means that have long been recognized in Utah Courts, and 
which would vindicate his constitutional rights. In equity, Mr. Stone should be allowed to 
obtain and perpetuate the evidence requested in his Petition. 
III. A party to a lawsuit, or a person who expects to be made a party to a lawsuit, should 
not have his or her right to obtain and perpetuate evidence trumped by an opposing 
party's action in filing a Small Claims Affidavit. 
The trial court's order below is essentially an argument that discovery cannot be 
had in a separate action until all other procedures in the small claims court are exhausted. 
This presents a classic chicken and the egg dilemma for Mr. Stone. The small claims 
court could just as easily argue Mr. Stone must first exhaust his remedies to obtain 
discovery in a separate action before the small claims court rules on the constitutional 
issues raised by Mr. Slade's refusal to participate in discovery. 
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The Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure, Rule 6(a) clearly states, "No formal 
discovery may be conducted but the parties are urged to exchange information prior to the 
trial." As noted by Mr. Slade in his opposition to the petition, Mr. Stone has attempted to 
vindicate his constitutional rights before the small claims court.4 Those attempts have 
been rejected without consideration. Indeed, the small claims courts could only vindicate 
a defendant's constitutional rights by ignoring the rules. For this reason a separate action 
for discovery is especially appropriate. A separate discovery action preserves the current 
rules of small claims procedure intact, while still respecting a defendant's constitutional 
rights to an adequate defense. 
In its most common form, exhaustion of remedies is applied to reviews of 
administrative proceedings, "We note at the outset of our analysis that 'parties must 
exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review.' 
Where this precondition to suit is not satisfied, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction." 
Housing Authority of County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ^ 11, 44 P.3d 724 
(internal citations omitted). However, the small claims court is not an administrative 
entity and this aspect of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is inapplicable. 
Another aspect of exhaustion of remedies is when a court proceeding is in reality a 
review of a lower court or a collateral appeal, such as in an extraordinary writ proceeding. 
4
 In addition to the Jury Demand noted by Mr. Slade at Memo, in Opp., ^ 6, R. p. 
15, Mr. Stone also submitted a bench memorandum and made verbal motions to obtain 
discovery. Further, in the second small claims case Mr. Stone has attempted to file a 
written motion to vindicate his constitutional rights to discovery. However, that motion 
was rejected for filing by the clerk and recently at the judge, both in contradiction to Rule 
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See e.g. Thomas v. State, 2002 UT 128, ^  6, 63 P.3d 672 (Criminal defendant not entitled 
to extraordinary relief where issues raised in petition either were or could have been 
raised on appeal.); Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 1999 UT 12, ffl[ 5-6, 974 
P.2d 286 (Corporation's attempt to obtain declaratory judgment an improper interlocutory 
appeal where the same issues could have been resolved in a pending adjudicative 
proceeding where an identical issue had been raised and adjudicated by the Tax 
Commission.). However, the underlying action is a separate action from the small claims 
actions filed by Mr. Slade. To be sure, Mr. Stone has attempted to raise his constitutional 
rights to obtain discovery in the small claims court. In addition, Mr. Stone has raised 
other issues which cannot be raised in this action, such as the right to a jury. Mr. Stone 
also filed the underlying petition prior to the proceeding filed by Mr. Slade. It could be 
just as easily argued Mr. Slade has not exhausted his remedies by seeking adjudication in 
this matter before proceeding in the small claims court. However, by the rules of the 
small claims court, the defendant's rights to obtain and perpetuate evidence cannot be 
adjudicated in that court. In addition, if such a requirement were imposed, the provisions 
of Rule 27, Rule 27(c) and Rule 34(c) would be meaningless, as no separate action for 
discovery could be possible. Mr. Stone does not seek review of the small claims court's 
decision, indeed that court has not yet made any relevant decision, instead, Mr. Stone 
seeks to obtain and perpetuate evidence necessary to later defend himself in the small 
6(b) of the Rules of Small Claims Procedure. 
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claims proceeding. As that is not possible pursuant to the small claims court rules, a 
separate action is the most appropriate method to obtain the required evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stone, as all potential defendants before any court of this state, has 
constitutional rights to obtain and perpetuate evidence necessary for him to defend 
himself in any court of this state. Unfortunately, recent developments of the law relating 
to small claims courts has allowed personal injury plaintiffs to seek a trial while at the 
same time denying and preventing their opponents any opportunity to obtain discovery of 
highly relevant evidence necessary for the defense of a personal injury action. Because of 
this, it is necessary to provide an alternate means by which a defendant may vindicate his 
constitutional rights. A separate action for discovery pursuant to Rule 27, or an equitable 
order allowing discovery is the most appropriate way to both allow a defendant to obtain 
a fair trial and maintain the simplicity of small claims court rules. Therefore the appellant 
requests this court to overturn the trial court's order and hold the defendant should be 
allowed an order under Rule 27 or in equity to obtain the discovery prayed for in his 
Petition. 
DATED this ^ day of Octotober 2003. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Todd A. Turnblom 
Attorney for Appellant and Petitioner 
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Addendum A 
September 10,2003 Small Claims Judgment 
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Addendum B 
Utah Code Ann. § 104-52-2 (1933) 
[519] Title 104—Code o6 Civil Procedure 104-52-2 
relating to depositions, so far as applicable and not inconsistent with 
said sections shall apply to depositions pursuant to the said sections. 
(C. L. 17, § 7177.) 
CroBs-Jiefereiices-
U&e of reported testimony on subse-
quent trial, 1QR-45-& 
CHAPTER 52 
PERPETUATING TESTIMONY 
104-52-1. Authorized a* Provided >» 3rt<i-J>2-5, 
This Chapter. 
104-52-2. Application for — Grounds 
—Procedure. 104-52-6. 
104-52-3. Powers of Persons Author-
104-52-4. Examination of witness — 
Return. 
Payors Included ??» Return 
£rima Facie Evidence of 
Facts. 
Use of Deposition—Objec-
tion and Exception. 
Id. 
1A4—|>2—!.. -Authorized as Provided itt THis Chspicr 
The testimony of a witness may be taken and pen 
jn thi.? chapter. 
provided 
(C.L. 17, §7193.) 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Cnii Proe. Cede, ? 2Q83, Idshr? 
Codev 516-1101, Mont *Rcv. Codes, § 10t>$t> (identical). 
Iowa Cod© 1939. § 11400 (testimony of 
witness may be perpetuated in manner 
px^scriuCu/. I t d C - t ' A 
Cross-references. 
Fees in proceedings to perpetuate tes* 
timohy, 28-2-2. 
Decisions from other jurisdiction*. 
— California-
Court may take deposition of nonresi-
dent witness for u?e on new trial where 
it is shown that h6 is the only -witness 
on a material point and is under sen-
tence of death in sister 9tate, even 
though death sentence is later suspended, 
and ths issue is not whether the testi-
mony will be material to the issues al-
ready tried, but whether it will be ma-
teria! on a new trial, and mandamus will 
lie to compel the court to issue a com-
mission in a proper case. San Francisco 
Gas Sz Electric Co v. Superior Court 
of City and Countv of San Francisco, 
15o Cai- 3D, 99 P. 359, 1? Ann. Cas. 933. 
Application should set out nature of 
anticipated contrrrvgrzy, the interest of 
the applicant, and the claims of adverse 
parties therein, with sufficient certainty 
to enable the court to sofct}p prnpoa&d 
interrogatories or to compel witnesses to 
answer question* propounded to them, so 
that Court may determine whether such 
questions are material to the contro-
for ElDorado* County, 79 Cal. App. 361, 
24!) P. 2?C». 
It will rot be arezumed that produc-
tion of records will be required, and peti-
tion is sufficient aa to proposed testimony 
which could be hy question and answer* 
although failififir "t» set forth contem-
plated action. Kutner-GoIdsteiTi Co. v. 
Superior Court of Fresno County, 212 
Cal. 341, 298 P. 1001. 
— Montana-
A petition which states the facts re-
quircc* by the- statute is sufficient, wad 
an adverse party may be examined as a 
witness. State v. District Court of 
Seventeenth' Judicial District, 54 Mont. 
574. 172 P. 329. 
104-52-2. Application for—Grounds—Procedure 
The applicant must produce to a district indge a petition verified by 
his oath stating: 
(13**3 CODE OP riVTL PROCEDURE 104-52-1—104-52-6 
CHAPTER 52 
PERPETUATING TESTIMONY 
104-52-1. Authori7ed as Provided in This 
Chapter, 
The testimony of a witness may be taken and 
perpetuated as provided in this -chapter. 
tn T t T ft rri 09 \ 
Fee* A» proc^5u5«M9 *0 pi^rprt^iV fcc«t*3ii<my, £8-2-2. 
104-52-2. Application for—Grounds—Proce-
dure. 
The applicant must produce to a district judge 
a petition verified hj his oath stating. 
(1) That the applicant expects to be a party 
to an action in a court in this state, and in such 
case the names of the persons who he expects 
will be adverse parties; orr 
(2) That the proof of some fact is necessary 
to perfect the title to property in which he 
is interested or to establish marriage, descent, 
heirship, or any other matter which it may here-
after become material to establish, though no 
suit may at the time be anticipated, or if antici-
pated, -Jie may not know the parties to such suit; 
3.7* Uf 
(3) Th* tiAmp of thp wifneAS to b* exam-
ined, his place of residence, and a general out-
line of the facts expected to be proved. 
The judge to whom such petition is presented 
must make an order allowing the examination, 
and des?prnsLt!TS£ ths officer before whom the 
game must be taken and prescribing the notice 
to be given. Such notice, if the parties expectant 
are known and reside in this state, must be for-
mally served, and if unknown, sucn nonce must 
be Served uli tbe recorder of the county where 
Hm property to he affected by the evidence is 
situated or the judge making the ordrr resides, 
as may be directed by him, and by publication 
thereof in some newspaper, to be designated by 
the judge, for the same period required for the 
publication of summons. The judge must also 
designate in his order the clerk of the c«urt to 
whom the deposition must be returned when 
taken. (C. L. 17, § 7194.) 
Publication ©f euoimoce, 101-5-13. 
i04~52-3. Powers of Persons Authorized to 
i a K 6 xscpOSitiCn* 
The person appointed hy the JU.&&Q to tike th** 
^position is authorized, if a resident of this 
[jfetate, on receiving a copy of the order of the 
[fudge and of the notice prescribed in the next 
preceding section, with proof of its personal 
iferVics or publication, or, if a resident without 
me state, on receiving the commission mentioned 
•a the next succeeding section, with proof of 
like service or publication of the notice, to take 
tne deposition oi the witness named in the order 
of the judge, or in the commission, or if more 
than o^e witness is thy* nawigd, *vf such of +h#»m 
as appear before him, at the time designated, and 
to continue the taking of the same from time to 
time. (C. U 17, § 7195.) 
104-52-4. Examination of Wltaess—Ketarflu 
The examination must be by tjuestios and 
answer, and if tho testimony is to be taken in 
another state or territory, it must be taken upon 
a commission to be issued by the judge allowing 
the examination, under the seal of the court of 
which he is judge, and upon interrogatories to 
be settled in the same manner as in cases of dep-
ositions taken under commission in pending 
aclions, unless the parties expectant, if known, 
otherwise agree. If such parties are unknown, 
notice of the settlement of the interrogatories 
shall be published in some newspaper for such 
time as the judge may designate. The deposi* 
tion when completed mu9t be carefully read to, 
and subscribed by, the witness, then certified 
by the officer or person taking tho same, and 
shall then be sealed up and delivered or trans-
mitted to tb£ clerk of th€ court designated 5n the 
OTAPT of thp judge allowing the reami nation, 
who shall file the same when received. The 
judge allowing the examination shall file with 
the clerk the order for examination, the petition 
on which the same was granted, with proof of 
(C, L 17 § 7196 ) 
104-52-5. Papers Included in Beturn Prima 
Facie Evidence of Facts. 
The petition, order snd other papers filed by 
tion, or a certified cony thereof are prima facie 
evidence of the facts stated therein to sho* com-
pliance with the provisio ns of this chapter. 
^C. h 17, § 7)97.) 
104-52-6 Use of Deposition—Objection atid 
Exception. 
If a trial is had between the parties named in 
the petition as parties expectant, or their suc-
cessors in interest, or between any parties where-
in it may be material to establish the facts which 
5D/»h depositions pro^ or tend to prove, upon 
proof of the death or insanity of the witnesses, 
or that they cannot be found, or arc unable by 
reason of age or other infirmity to give their 
testimony, ihe deposiiiojas or copies thereof may 
be used by either patty subject to all legal 
objections; but if the parties attend at the exam-
ination, no objection to the form of an ioterrog-
104-52-3 Title 104—Code of Civil Procedure [520] 
(1) That the applicant expects to be a parly to an action in a court 
in this state, and in such c&<e the names of the persona who he expects 
will be adverse parties; or, 
(2) That the proof of some fact is necessary to perfect the title to 
property in which he is interested or to establish marriage, descent, 
heirship, or any other matter which it may hereafter become mnteiial 
to establish, though no suit may at the time be anticipated, or if antici-
pated, he may not know the paxtw to such su*t; and, 
(3) The name of the wirnpss to hr examined, his place of resi-
dence, and a general outline of the facts expected to be proved. 
The judge to whom such petition is presented must make an order 
allowing the examination, and designating the officer before whom the 
same must be taken and prescribing the notice to be given. Such notice, 
if the parties expectam are known and reside in this state, must be for-
ma))y served, and if unknown, such notice must be served on the re-
corder of the county where the property to be affected by the evidence 
is situated or the judge making the order reside, as may be directed by 
him, and by publication thereof in some new&paper, to be designated by 
the judge, for the same period required for the publication of summons. 
The judge must also designate in his order the clerk of the court to 
whom the deposition must be returned when taken. (C L. 17, § 7194.) 
Tma section is practically identical 
with Laws 1851-1870, MT>, 2 Comp 
L*ws 1888. §S967. 
Comparable provisions. 
CftL CiviJ Proc Code, ^2084 (Stfbstan-
eluding paragraph- " * T T must be 
served" on the cleric of the county where 
the proper*v ° * r >'' siUiAl^d 
Idaho Code, s 16-2102. >tont "Rev 
Codes. § 10087 (substantiaHv tha qamc) 
Cr3vcis-r&f&renc££.' 
Publication of sumwoT)^ l(M-f>-l'!. 
104-52—3. Powers of Pei-sans Au*h«nzed t^ Take Dep^c^on. 
The p*r?07i zvv™"ted by the judge to t:?ke the deposition is author-
wed, if a resident of this state, on receiving a copy of thp ord^r af the 
judge and of the notice prescribed in the next preceding section with 
proof of its personal service or publication, or, if a resident without 
the state, on receiving the commission mentioned in the next succeeding 
section, with prool of like service or publication of the notice, to take 
tho deposition of the witness named in the order of the judge, or in the 
commission, or iC mere th^n one "witness is thus narru d, of such of them 
as appear before him, at the time designated, and to continue the taking 
of the s»me f^ om time to time. (C L 17 S 7195 ) 
CaJ Cnnl Proc. Codn, §2085, Idaho 
Code §lt>—nfi3, Mont. K.pv. Codes. 
5 10688 <«rah*UntiaUv identical! 
1. Testimony of jx»r«?on not expected to 
l ive . 
Testimony ol injured person nor ex-
pected to live could be perpetuated under 
I s/» •> v • v * i-k»»o 3v«v«uv\. Jit ^nukv.cvitu^ 
"instituted by his wi£c on behalf of her-
self and their minor children Ohio 
Copper Min C^. ,r. H^le^'Sp? "*?2 P. 
201.' ~ ""' 
A L U TI nte* 
Right to dietrovpTy n.*: TPgarfa facts 
ix-iSLLjun lf» a m o u n t ox riiiliT.^es., «o A, 
L R. 504 
Addendum C 
Small Claims Statutes 
SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 78-6-1 
6 CHAPTER 
SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 
Section Section 
78-6-1. Smail claims — Defined — Bian-
nual review — Counsel not nec-
essary — Deferring multiple 
claims of one plaintiff — Su-
preme" Court to govern proce-
dures 
78-6-1 5 Evening hours — Judges pro tem-
pore. 
78-6-2 to 78-6-5 Repealed 
78-6-6 Assignee may not file claim 
78-6-1. Small claims — Defined 
Counsel not necessary 
claims of one plaintiff — 
ern procedures. 
78-6-7 
78-6 H 
78-6-9 
78-6-10 
Repealed 
Object of small claims — Attach-
ment, garnishment, and execu-
tion 
Repealed 
Appeals ~- Who may take and 
jurisdiction 
78-6-11 to 78-6-13 Repealed 
78-6-14 
78-6-15 
Civil filing fees 
Costs 
— Biannual review — 
— Deferring multiple 
Supreme Court to gov-
(1) A small claims action is a civil action: 
(a) for the recovery of money where the amount claimed does not exceed 
$5,000 including attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and interest and 
where the defendant resides or the action of indebtedness was incurred 
within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is to be maintained; 
or 
(b) involving interpleader under Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in which the amount claimed does not exceed $5,000 including 
attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and interest. 
(2) The judgment in a small claims action may not exceed $5,000 including 
attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and interest. 
(3) Counter claims may be maintained in small claims actions if the counter 
claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of 
the plaintiff's claim. A counter claim may not be raised for the first time in the 
tr ial de novo of the small claims action. 
(4) The Judicial Council shall present to the Judiciary Interim Committee 
prior to the general session of the Legislature during odd-numbered years a 
report and recommendations concerning the maximum amount of small claims 
actions. 
(5) Persons or corporations may litigate actions on behalf of themselves in 
person or through authorized employees with or without counsel. 
(6) If a person or corporation other than a municipality or a political 
subdivision of the state files multiple small claims in any one court, the clerk 
or judge of the court may remove all but the initial claim from the court's 
calendar in order to dispose of all other small claims matters. Claims so 
removed shall be rescheduled as permitted by the court's calendar. 
(7) Small claims matters shall be managed in accordance with simplified 
rules of procedure and evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
3upp., 104-6-1; L. 1953, ch. 55, § 1; 1901, ch. 
80, § 1; 1969, ch. 256, § 1; 1970, ch. 26, § 1; 
1977, ch. 77, § 61; 1977, ch. 78, § 28; 1983, 
ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 48, § 1; 1986, ch. 187, 
§ 2; 1991, ch. 268, $ 42; 1992, ch. 127, § 14; 
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1993, ch. 177, * 1; 1995, ch. 47, § 3; 1996, ch. 
198, ^ 61; 1997, ch. 215, * 19. 
Cross-References. — Justice courts, § 78-
5-101 et seq jurisdiction m small claims ca«-es, 
§ 78-5-104(2) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action by corporation 
—Necessity for attorney 
Effect of affidavit 
Jurisdiction 
—Concurrent 
—Fraud or misrepresentation 
— Nature of action 
—Relief sought 
Action by corporation. 
—Necess i ty for attorney. 
Even though a corporation was a "person" 
which could maintain an action m a small 
claims court, a corporation could not practice 
law and an officer or employee of a corporation 
could not properly institute an action in the 
small claims court, it was required to act 
through a licensed attorney Tuttle v Hi Land 
Dairyman's Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P 2d 616 
(1960) (decided undex prior law) 
Effect of affidavit. 
The language on the back cf a small claims 
affidavit although containing directions con 
cermng evidentiary procedure that are binding 
on the parties, does not have the status of rules 
promulgated by the Supreme Court as contem-
plated by Subsection (7) Kawamoto v Fratto, 
2000 UT 6, 994 P 2d 187 
Jurisdict ion. 
—Concurrent. 
District court has concurrent jurisdiction 
with small claims court over civil claims under 
statutory limit Hanourt , Brace, Jovanovich 
Legal & Professional Publications, Inc v Gor-
don, 635 P2d 28 (Utah 1981) (decided under 
pnoi law) 
—Fraud or misrepresentat ion. 
While the jurisdiction of the small clnms 
couit is limited to claims for money only the 
small claims court is not divested of jurisdiction 
where fraud or misrepresentation is alleged as 
the basis for lecoveiy, therefore, small claims 
court had jurisdiction to enter ta in a food stamp 
fraud case involving the recovery of $270 
Kapetanov v SmalJ Claims Court, 659 P2d 
1049 (Utah 1983) 
—Nature of action. 
Neither automobile accident peisonai njury 
cases nor cases involving expert testimony are 
excluded from the small claims courts'junsdic 
tion Kawamoto v Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 991 P 2d 
187 
—Relief sought. 
Small claims junsdiction is not lmmed to 
those cases where the plaintiff is seeking liqui-
dated, ra ther than general, damages Kawa 
moto v Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 994 P2d 187 
The phrase "action for indebtedness" d >es not 
limit the type of damages necessary for c ises to 
be heard by the small claims courts Ra her, it 
provides small claims courts with an < Iterna-
tive location to the defendant's residenc e upon 
which to base jurisdiction Kawamoto v Fratto, 
2000 UT 6, 994 P 2d 187 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Salt Lake County 
Bar's Small Claims Court Project, 1978 Utah L 
Rev 701 
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Pa i t III, 
1995 Utah L Rev 683 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am J u r 2d Courts $ 31 
C.J.S. — 21 C J S Courts ^ 106 
A.L.R. — Operations of collection agency as 
unauthorized practice of law, 27 A L R 3d 1152 
Right of party litigant to defend or < ounter-
claim on ground that opposing part} or his 
attorney is engaged m unauthorized pr ictice of 
law, 7 A L R 4th J146 
Malicious prosecution defense of a ting on 
advice of justice of the peace, magistrate, or lay 
person, 48 A L R 4th 250 
Small claims jurisdictional limits as binding 
on appellate court, 67 A L R 4th 1117 
78-6-1.5. Evening hours — Judges pro tempore. 
The district or justice court may request that the Supreme Court appoint a 
member of the Utah State Bar in good standing, with the member's consent, as 
judge pro tempore to hear and determine small claims at times, including 
evening sessions, to be set by the court Such judges pro tempore, aft< r being 
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duly sworn, shall serve voluntarily and without compensation at the request of 
the court, shall be extended the same immunities, and shall have the same 
powers with respect to matters withm the jurisdiction of the small claims court 
as may be exercised by a judge thereof 
History: C. 1953, 78-6-1.5, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Jurisdiction of dis-
1981, ch. 88, $ 1; 1991, ch. 268, <> 43; 1996, tnc t court judges, § 78-3-4 
ch. 198, <> 62. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Construction and validity of state 
provisions governing designation of substitute, 
pro tempore, or special judge, 97 A L R 5th 537 
78-6-2 to 78-6-5. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Laws 1991, ch 268, ^ 49 repeals order in small claims court and to preparation 
*ft 78-6-2, 78-6-2 2, and 78-6-2 5, as last and filing of interpleader affidavit, respectively, 
amended by Laws 1990, ch 59, **§ 33 to 35, effective January 1, 1992 
relating to small claims courts affidavit, order, Laws 1991, ch 268, % 49 repeals §§ 78-6-4 
and form, form for interpleader actions, and
 a n d 78-6-5, as last amended by Laws 1987, ch 
authorization for counterclaims and form for 233, ^ 1 and as enacted by Laws 1951, ch 58, 
counter affidavit, respectively, effective Janu- § i relating to time for notice and appearance 
ary 1, 199z
 m s m a n claims court and to requirement of 
Laws 1991, ch 268, § 49 repeals §§ 78-6-3 enumerating entries m the docket, respectively, 
and 78-6-3 5, as last amended by Laws 1990,
 e f f e c t l v e January 1, 1992 
ch 135, § 1 and as enacted by Laws 1986, ch «
 U1 ,, TTA , 
^n c o i x J. * r ni r For comparable provisions, see the Utah 
48, § 3, relating to preparation of filing of
 R u l e s o f S m a l l Claims Procedure 
amdavit and counter affidavit and service of 
78-6-6. Assignee may not file claim. 
No claim shall be filed or prosecuted in such small claim court by any 
assignee of such claim 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ^ 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-6-6. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am J u r 2d Courts § 31 
78-6-7. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Laws 1991, ch 268, § 49 repeals to witnesses m judgment m small claims court, 
§ 78-6-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating effective January 1, 1992 
78-6-8. Object of small claims — Attachment, garnish-
ment, and execution. 
(1) The hearing in a small claims action has the sole object of dispensing 
speedy justice between the parties. The record of small claims proceedings 
shall be as provided by rule of the Judicial Council. 
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(2) Attachment, garnishment, and execution may issue after judgment as 
prescribed by law, upon the payment of the fees required for these services. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ^ 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-6-8; L. 1961, ch. 180, ^ 1; L986, 
ch. 47, * 75; 1988, ch. 73, § 3; 1988, ch. 248, 
* 40; 1991, ch. 268, * 44; 1997, ch. 215, ^ 20. 
Cross-References. — Attachment, Rule 
64C U R C P 
Execution, Rule 69, U R C P 
Exemptions from execution, § 78-23-1 et seq 
Garnishment, Rule 64D, U R C P 
Wrongful attachment injustice court, misde-
meanor, monetary penalty, § 76-8-603 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
m Utah Law, 2000 Utah L Rev 841 (2000) 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jui 2d Courts § 31 
78-6-9. Repealed. 
R e p e a l s . — Laws 1991 ch 268,*} 49 repeals 
*} 78 6 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating 
to judgment against defendant and payment in 
small claims courts, effective January 1, 1992 
78-6-10. Appeals — Who may take and jurisdiction. 
(1) Either party may appeal the judgment in a small claims action to the 
district court of the county by filing a notice of appeal m the original trial court 
within ten days of the notice of entry of the judgment If the judgment in a 
small claims action is entered by a judge or judge pro tempore of the district 
court, the notice of appeal shall be filed with the district court 
(2) The appeal is a trial de novo and shall be tried in accordance with the 
procedures of small claims actions, except a record of the trial shall be 
maintained The trial de novo may not be heard by a judge pro tempore 
appointed under Section 78-6-1 5 The decision of the trial de novo may not be 
appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, * 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-6-10; L. 1986, ch. 47, ^ 76; 1988, 
ch. 73, i? 4; 1996, ch. 198, * 63; 1997, ch. 215, 
<> 21. 
Cross-References. — A ppeal from district 
court to Court of Appeals, § 78-2a-3 
Trial de novo, ^ 78 3 4(5) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANAIYSIS 
Constitutionality 
—Limitation on plaintiff's right to appeal 
—Time for filing notice of appeal 
Notice of entry of judgment 
Cited 
Constitutionality. 
— Limitation on plaintiff's r ight to appeal . 
This section does not violate the tqual pro 
tection guarantees of the state constitution by 
its limitation of plaintiff's right to appeal only 
from judgment against him granted on a coun 
terclaim to defendant while not so limiting 
defendant's right Liedtke / Schettler, 649 P2d 
80 (Utah 1982) 
—-Time for filing not ice of appeal. 
Given the nature and purpose of the small 
claims court it was not unreasonable for the 
Legislature to differentiate between it and city 
and district courts with respect to the time 
allotted foi filing a notice of appeal, therefore, 
the s tatute does not violate the equal protection 
clause Larson Ford Sales, Inc v Silver, 551 
P2d 233 (Utah 1976) appeal dismissed, 429 
U S 909 97 S Ct 299, 50 L Ed 2d 277 (1976) 
(decided under prior law) 
Notice of entry of judgment . 
Subsection (1) provides that a party must 
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receive actual notice that a small claims judg-
ment has been entered before the ten-day ap-
peal period commences and in the absence of 
evidence that a notice of appeal was filed more 
than ten days after the defendant or his attor-
ney received actual notice of a judgment, the 
appeal must be deemed timely and heard on its 
merits Chevron v Grant 831 P 2d 1038 (Utah 
Ct App 1992; 
Ci ted m Salt Lake- City Corp v Leah>, 848 
P.2d 179 (Utah Ct App 1993), Kawamoto v 
Fratto, 2000 UT 6, 994 P2d 187 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-6-12 5, as enacted by Laws 1983, ch 77, ^ 4, 
relating to abstract of judgment for defendant 
m small claims court, and 78-6-13, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, relating to filing of abstract 
and docketing of judgment m small claims 
courts, effective January 1, 1992 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees m Utah L Rev 841 (2000) 
Utah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553 Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jui 2d Courts i? 31 
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2000 
78-6-11 to 78-6-13. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Laws 1986, ch 47, % 80 repeals 
§ 78-6-11, as amended by Laws 1981, ch 90, 
§ 17, relating to the procedure for taking ap-
peals 
Laws 1991, ch 268, § 49 repeals §§ 78-6-12, 
Utah Code Annotated 3953, relating to abstract 
of judgment for plaintiff in small claims courts, 
78-6-14. Civil filing fees. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, the fees for a small claims action in 
justice court shall be the same as provided in Section 78-7-35. 
(2) Fees collected in small claims actions filed in municipal justice court are 
remitted to the municipal treasurer. Fees collected in small claims actions filed 
in a county justice court are remitted to the county treasurer. 
(3) (a) Seven dollars and 50 cents shall be withheld from the fee for the 
small claims affidavit and allocated to the Judges' Retirement Trust Fund. 
Five dollars shall be withheld from the fee for a small claims counter 
affidavit and allocated to the Judges' Retirement Trust Fund 
(b) Two dollars withheld from the civil filing fee in a court of record as 
provided in Subsection 63-63a-8(4)(b) shall not apply to the fees collected 
for small claims actions in justice court. 
(4) The fee in the justice court for filing a notice of appeal for trial de novo 
in a court of record is $10. The fee covers all services of the justice court on 
appeal but does not satisfy the trial de novo filing fee in the court of record. 
History: C. 1953, 78-6-14, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 290, § 10; 1997, ch. 215, § 22; 2001, 
ch. 46, <j 27. 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws 
1992, ch 290, § 10 repeals former § 78-6-14, as 
last amended by L 1991, ch 268, § 45, listing 
civil filing fees, and enacts the present section, 
effective July 1, 1992. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "Sec-
tion 78-7-35" for "Section 21-1-5" m Subsection 
(1) 
Cross-References. — Justice courts, Chap-
ter 5 of this title. 
78-6-15. Costs. 
The prevailing party in any small claims action is entitled to costs of the 
action and also the costs of execution upon a judgment rendered therein. 
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